Captive labour: asylum seekers, migrants and employment in UK immigration removal centres by Jon, Burnett
 Cronfa -  Swansea University Open Access Repository
   
_____________________________________________________________
   
This is an author produced version of a paper published in :
Race & Class
                               
   
Cronfa URL for this paper:
http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa33870
_____________________________________________________________
 
Paper:
Burnett, J. & Chebe, F. (2010).  Captive labour: asylum seekers, migrants and employment in UK immigration removal
centres. Race & Class, 51(4), 95-103.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0306396810363051
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________
  
This article is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the
terms of the repository licence. Authors are personally responsible for adhering to publisher restrictions or conditions.
When uploading content they are required to comply with their publisher agreement and the SHERPA RoMEO
database to judge whether or not it is copyright safe to add this version of the paper to this repository. 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/iss/researchsupport/cronfa-support/ 
  1 
Captive labour: asylum seekers, migrants and employment in UK Immigration 
Removal Centres 
 
Jon Burnett and Fidelis Chebe 
 
Throughout New Labour’s period of government there has been a well documented 
steady rise in the number of people within the immigration and asylum processes 
being detained. In November 1997, the year that the government came to power, there 
were 787 people detained, who had claimed asylum, through the use of immigration 
powers. Ten years later, in December 2007, this number had increased by roughly 
eighty five per cent to 1455. These figures, however, represent only a snapshot at a 
given moment in time. They do not include, for example, people held in prison cells 
or by the prison service. Whilst figures are not available for the number of asylum 
seekers detained throughout each consecutive year, in the House of Lords it was 
estimated that, in 1999, approximately 15,000 people were detained under 
Immigration legislation.1 In 2004, Amnesty International suggested that 25,000 
people who had sought asylum were detained.2 According to Bail for Immigration 
Detainees (BID) slightly less than 30,000 people, not exclusively asylum seekers, a 
year are detained through the use of immigration powers.3 
 
Many of the people who are detained using immigration powers are those seeking 
asylum. Ostensibly, asylum seekers are detained for administrative purposes including 
risks of absconding, and awaiting deportation. At all stages of the asylum process, an 
individual is liable for detention; and its use has long been condemned by a range of 
organisations, campaigners, and researchers.4 Length of time varies dramatically and 
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in December 2008 the Home Office stated that 675 people in detention, at that point, 
as a result of immigration powers had been detained for less than twenty nine days. 
Detained Lives, a report published by the London Detainee Support Group (LDSG) a 
month later emphasised that there is an increasing use of long term detention of 
people criminalised through immigration powers. Their research utilised interviews 
with people whose ‘crimes’ included using fake documents to try and procure 
employment, and claiming asylum using a different name. On average, they had been 
detained for two years and the LDSG drew attention to a world of ‘despair and 
psychological deterioration’.5  
 
A consolidating labour industry 
 
That the rising number of asylum and immigration detainees shows no signs of 
abating is tied to political will. Much like the spiralling use of prison (60,131 when 
New Labour came to power in May 1997; 82,868 at the beginning of May 2009), the 
use of detention emphasises decisions consciously made by governments about how 
to deal with particular social issues. In this context, (and again with parallels to the 
prison system), New Labour has consolidated trends of contracting out the detention 
of asylum seekers and migrants to the private sector. There are currently eleven 
Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs), of which eight are operated and managed by 
private companies.6 And just as policy makers and profiteers have long recognised 
that the prison population exists as a cheap and highly exploitable workforce; asylum 
and immigration detainees are beginning to be seen in the same light.  
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Whilst the exact number of people working within immigration removal facilities is 
unknown, available information indicates that a particular form of labour market is 
beginning to take shape. Following the introduction of the Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Act 2006, whereupon IRCs were exempted from paying the minimum 
wage, at least nine IRCs now have work opportunities available. As a rough picture, 
the detainee labour industry looks something like the following: 
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Employment within Immigration Removal Centres 
Immigration 
Removal Centre   
Detainee Employment 
Campsfield 
House  
(Run by GEO 
Group Ltd) 
Paid work expanded in 2008. There were forty roles, of which 
thirty seven were filled and of these thirty seven there were at 
least twelve cleaners, nine kitchen assistants, three gardeners, 
two litter pickers, one library orderly, one classroom orderly, 
and one ‘buddy’.7 
 
Dover 
(Run by HM 
Prison Service) 
In 2008 there was an increase in employment arrangements with 
around ninety employment opportunities. Sixty five people were 
employed as cleaners, between six and eight people worked in 
the kitchens, four people worked as painters, and twelve people 
worked in bicycle workshops.8  
 
Currently, paid work opportunities include: Kitchen assistants, 
decorating, cycle repair shop, cleaning (wing based), food 
preparation, orderlies (for example in the gym, or in education), 
and the ‘helping hands scheme’ (through, for example, 
translating).9 
 
Dungavel 
(Managed by 
Current work opportunities include hygiene monitors, grounds 
officers and servery assistants.10 
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G4S on behalf of 
the UK Border 
Agency) 
Harmondsworth 
(Managed by 
Kalyx services 
on behalf of UK 
Borger Agency) 
In 2008 work was available, and at the time of an inspection by 
HM Inspectorate of Prisons twenty one detainees were employed 
in roles including orderlies in the gym and residential units, and 
as ‘friends’ who showed new detainees around and explained the 
rules of the IRC. Posts removing graffiti and litter picking had 
not been taken up.11 The IRC planned more job creation for 
2009, and there are currently work opportunities available.12     
  
Haslar 
(Operated by 
The HM Prison 
Service) 
 
In 2007 there were at least twenty eight jobs available in a 
variety of areas, and between six and eight jobs were due to be 
added when a bicycle repair shop opened.13  
 
 
Lindholme 
(Managed by 
HM Prison 
Service) 
 
In 2008 there were at least twenty two jobs available and roles 
included working in the kitchen, working in the gardens, 
cleaning work and one off special projects.14 
 
Currently, paid work is available and jobs include kitchen work, 
gardening, and cleaning.15 
 
Oakington In 2008 there were at least twenty one jobs as education 
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(Managed by 
G4S on behalf of 
the UK Border 
Agency) 
mentors, residential block orderlies, litter collectors and table 
cleaners in the canteen.16 
Tinsley House, 
Gatwick 
No paid work (as of March 2008).17 
Yarl’s Wood 
(Managed by 
Serco) 
 
Opportunities are currently available for paid work.18 
Colnbrook Provision for work expanded in 2008. Jobs included serving 
food, cleaning, decorating and working on food preparation.19  
 
Brook House, 
Gatwick 
(G4S Group) 
(Opened March 2009 – information not yet available). 
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Of course, this picture, as mentioned above, provides only a very broad image. Its 
information rests on the work of prison inspections and the annual reports of 
Independent Monitoring Boards which, by necessity, discuss the year previously. 
Nevertheless, this information does begin to provide an outline of the extent to which 
detainee labour is utilised, and the work that this industry creates.  
 
The tasks given to immigration and asylum detainees reveal much about the way their 
presence is seen, by policy makers, within the country. As well as carrying out tasks 
relating to the upkeep of their incarceration, UK born prisoners are put to work whilst 
incarcerated, in some cases at least with a desire (no matter how tokenistic) to 
(re)integrate them within the labour market upon their release. That this stated aim is 
tokenistic is highlighted by abolitionist campaigner Joe Black who notes that 
education, training, and employment (ETE) outcomes are prioritised below a desire 
for prison work to ‘ensure dynamic security…’.20 Of roughly 28,600 prisoners 
working in 2008 at any given time 16,800 were performing administrative tasks 
relating to the upkeep of the institution, as opposed to 11,800 engaged in workshops. 
Of this 11,800, fourty per cent were on ‘contract services’ ‘producing goods for 
private sector companies’ in a market worth over £30 million a year.21 Profits appear 
to be prioritised far higher than people. 
 
But if the above indicates a degree of subterfuge, on the part of the prison service 
about the raison d’être of incarceration labour; within IRC’s this deception is not even 
attempted. The pretence that work is available so as to increase skills or prospects 
upon release does not exist and where jobs are created they predominantly seek to 
engage detainees with the upkeep of their own incarceration. There are, it must be 
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said, exceptions. And Dover IRC for example put people to work last year in a curious 
system of aid; with detainees building bicycles which were shipped to children in 
Gambia.22 However in most cases, where work is available, detainees are frequently 
employed as cleaners, litter pickers, kitchen assistants, decorators, and block orderlies. 
In this way, a core rationale of detainee labour is to reduce expenditure on essential 
aspects of the day to day running of the detention estate. IRC’s may not yet have 
opened themselves out to those companies who are so eager to utilise cheap labour, 
but they have been quick to take advantage of these opportunities themselves. Even if 
paid the minimum wage, currently standing at £5.73 for adults, £4.77 for those aged 
between 18-21, and £3.53 for the ‘youth rate’ between school leaving age and 18, 
contracted cleaners or kitchen assistants for example would still require wages which 
outweighed those that detainees can demand. 
 
A super-exploitable workforce 
 
Detained people have historically been utilised as super-exploitable workforce and, as 
Angela Davis has extensively discussed, imprisoned workers are routinely made 
available for the use of capital as a result of the discriminatory and coercive work of 
criminal justice systems. Discussing this trend in the United States at the end of the 
20th Century she quoted Michael Lamar Powell, a prisoner in Alabama who stated:  
 
I cannot go on strike, nor can I unionize. I am not covered by workers’ 
compensation of the Fair Labour Standards Act. I agree to work late-night and 
weekend shifts. I do just what I am told, no matter what it is. I am hired and 
fired at will, and I am not even paid minimum wage: I earn one dollar a 
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month. I cannot even voice grievances or complaints, except at the risk of 
incurring arbitrary discipline of some covert retaliation.23 
 
The UK may not utilise the prison to the same mass extent as the United States; but as 
Joe Sim has discussed England and Wales has become ‘the prison capital of Western 
Europe’24 and certain obvious parallels can nevertheless be drawn. Wages, in a similar 
way, are compressed to minimal levels and as Joe Back has discussed, the average 
weekly wage in 2008 of a prisoner was £8: less than what the average child received 
in pocket money.25 In IRCs, guidance produced at the end 2008 of made clear that 
detainees should be paid £1 an hour normally, and £1.25 per hour for restricted 
projects (like, for example, painting a series of rooms).26 Even here though, there are 
abuses and Corporate Watch has brought attention to migrants being paid 83 pence 
per hour.27 Such wages are not only low in the context of their real value. Within 
IRCs, detainees have voiced complaints that the products that can be purchased are 
priced particularly high. In Dover in 2008, for example, detainees articulated that 
phone cards, priced at either £3 or £5 were too expensive.28 Such complaints are of 
particular importance in a context where phone cards can prove a vital lifeline with 
regard to contacting lawyers, support groups and friends who, in turn, could well 
mean the difference between being able to build up an anti-deportation case and being 
forcibly removed from the country.  
 
The disciplinary power of detainee labour 
In the context outlined above, the emerging labour industry within IRCs acts as a 
process that seeks to discipline detainees. That is, labour works to foster certain 
behaviours and visions of order within the confines of the institution providing these 
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‘opportunities’. This observation, of course, is not new. Particularly when read in the 
context of prison labour more generally. In Foucaults’ Discipline and Punish, he 
discussed prison labour as central to an architecture of control. Its function, in part, 
combined attempts to create a strict and ordered regime with realigning the behaviour 
of the individual.29 These insights are salient with regard to paid work within IRCs 
which, as we have seen above, may be important for the detainee in that the financial 
rewards – no matter how exploitative – can assist in attempts to maintain contact with 
external support networks. Even where this is not the case, the ‘wages’ received from 
working provide an opportunity to purchase the most basic of items. Again in Dover, 
some of the most popular items sold at the shop were pieces of fruit.30 However, with 
jobs not available for all detainees in IRCs, institutions have created processes 
through which jobs must be applied for on the one hand, and can be removed on the 
other. In Colnbrook (CIRC) for example, the Independent Monitoring Board noted 
last year that:  
 
[P]aid work is only available to detainees who are compliant with the regime 
in CIRC, the downside is that even the smallest failures by detainees can 
sometimes result in paid work being taken away. This can often appear to be a 
disproportionate response from the detainee’s perspective.31 
 
Existing as a ‘reward’ for behaviours seen as conducive to the maintenance of order, 
labour consequently coerces discipline and compliance. As made clear, workers can 
be fired simply on the basis that they exhibit behaviours which are not seen as correct 
within the context of the IRC. According to Home Office guidance provision of work 
should ‘be directly linked to a level of compliance by the detainee on two levels’: 
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a. With the centre operator – only detainees who are on the enhanced level of 
the enhancements scheme may be allowed to engage on paid work. 
 
b. With the UK Border Agency – only those detainees who are actively co-
operating with the Agency in relation to resolution of their immigration 
case may be allowed to engage in paid work.32 
 
Examples of ‘non-compliance’ are given as failure to attend interviews, disruptive 
behaviour in the IRC or whilst the individual is being removed, and a refusal to 
complete application forms.33 What such schemes consolidate, in theory at least, are 
regimes in which detainees are forced into assisting with the maintenance of order. In 
Campsfield this is made explicit where it is suggested that ‘[d]etainees involved in 
paid work are more content, and help maintain the Centre at a lower level of 
tension’.34 However, where this creates order through a system of rewards and 
punishments for behaviour, the reward that is on offer is highly exploitative labour. 
The benefits for the IRC only emphasise the cruelty of an immigration and asylum 
system which seeks quite unequivocally to carry on locking up more and more people 
in the immigration and asylum process. According to the Campaign to Close 
Campsfield labour is ‘forced in the sense that [detainees] are locked up for 24 hours a 
day, uncertain of their future and with no money to purchase any essentials they may 
need’.35 Yet, at the same, detainees must acquiesce to practices which seek to effect 
their own removal in order to get the opportunity to work. IRCs – prisons in all but 
name – save costs on their maintenance by taking full advantage of legislation which 
invites them to exploit their inmates. Whilst simultaneously, they create conditions 
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where detainees are reliant on this exploitation for financial ‘opportunities’. 
Oakington IRC, paying its detainees in vouchers redeemable as cash within its 
confines, makes this exploitative economy cyclical by ensuring that all profits 
ultimately go back into the account of G4S, the company who manages it.36 
 
Conclusion         
 
The human misery which the UK detention estate embodies can not be overstated. In 
the first six months of 2008 incidences of self-harm rose by seventy three per cent37 
and there have been numerous cases of detainees ending their own lives whilst 
incarcerated.38 According to allegations made by the Chief Inspector of Prisons Anne 
Owers, at Lindholme IRC staff in 2007 were issued with staves – banned in low 
security prisons – in order to enforce discipline.39 It is in this framework that an 
emerging labour market must be placed. Work is envisioned, at least in part, in order 
to foster order. Yet the evidence of numerous investigations suggests that this ‘order’ 
is also maintained by the use, or threat, of physical force. 
 
There is fundamental and obvious irony in that people who are prohibited from 
working as a result of their immigration status can be put in conditions where they 
have to accept exploitative working practices if detained. This is embedded further if 
considering the fact that whilst on the one hand the government is massively 
increasing resources and manpower to investigate and prevent undocumented 
working; on the other it is sanctioning conditions that have many of the hallmarks of 
undocumented working in IRCs. It is not uncommon for undocumented workers to be 
paid similar wages to the £1.25 per hour maximum rate recommended by the Home 
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Office for detainees. And many of the coercive elements inherent within 
undocumented working – the ability to fire workers at will, the lack of mechanisms of 
redress, the precarity of workers’ immigration status40 - are apparent with regard to 
detainee labour.  
 
Ultimately, these conditions must be understood in a wider context of exploitation. An 
emerging labour industry within the UK’s detention estate provides profit for those 
who have taken advantage of a growing market for locking up asylum seekers and 
other migrants. It is necessary that such practices, in their entirety, are recognised to 
be exactly what they are. For as Angela Davis has discussed:  
 
Once the aura of magic is stripped away from the imprisonment solution… 
what is revealed is racism, class bias and the parasitic seduction of capitalist 
profit within a system that materially and morally impoverishes its 
inhabitants…41 
 
Exploitative working conditions are only one part of the core that is revealed when 
this magic is stripped away. In this way, the struggle against the exploitation of people 
whilst they are detained must be connected more widely to the struggle against a 
detention estate which locks up increasing numbers of people who are criminalised, 
demonised, and victimised.  
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